1 STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN ARGENTINA: ECONOMIC IDEAS, ECONOMIC POLICY, AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS DURING THE INTER-WAR PERIOD. THE CASE OF ALEJANDRO E. BUNGE.* GABRIEL R. MOLTENI London School of Economics Universidad Católica Argentina ABSTRACT This paper provides an insight into the development of ideas on industrialisation in Argentina during the inter-war period. lt focuses on the contribution of Alejandro E. Bunge, one of the most important economic thinkers, who raised his voice during a period of external and internal crises that highlighted the deep-rooted institutional constraints and dynamic problems of the contemporary development strategy: the primary-export model. The main theme outlined in this paper is the industrialisation strategy proposed by Bunge. This strategy was part of a wider development scheme that cannot be classified according to the tradicional primary-export modelimport-substitution industrialisation model dichotomy, and therefore, Bunge's industrial strategy was quite different and more rational to the one that would be implemented after 1940s. The sources used are most of Bunge's research works: eight books and approximately tour hundred articles -most of which were published in the Revista de Economía Argentina. Introduction By 1910 Argentina offered a convincing example of the benefit of the principle of international division of labour, and therefore, of economic specialisation. Argentina was a country that having an agrarian base -producing and exporting some staples as meat, hides, wool and cereals- managed lo achieve a standard of living similar to that of industrialised national. This extraordinary performance was the result of a complementary relationship with the United Kingdom. This country provided, on the one hand, capital, infrastructure and manufactures, and on the other hand, the market for agricultural commodities. However, contrary lo what one could have expected, the evolution of economic ideas in Argentina was not predominantly in favour of an agrarian destiny. Falcoff points out that economic thought
2 was characterised by "the persistence of dissonant voices speaking above the din in favour of industrialisation and economic independence"3. Those voices started as soon as by the end of nineteenth century and extended until 1930s, when the aforementioned ideas begun to win support and some economic reforms started to be implemented. Among those voices, which have remained largely unexplored, it is worth lo analyse the case of Alejandro E. Bunge. The -historiography has traditionally affirmed that there was not a clear, coherent, and systematic proposal of a new economic strategy (economic and institutional reforms) during the period under review, especially before However, the main argument of my thesis is that Bunge gave conclusive evidence about the impossibility of advancing as in the past, and sound evidence that the new direction was much more promising. This paper introduces Alejandro Bunge and his economic development scheme briefly, and focuses on his industrialisation strategy. * This research was carried out at the London School of Economics as part of PhD studies under the supervision Dr. Colin M. Lewis. lt was presented at the Annual Conference of the Economic History Society at Birmingham (april 2002). lt was financed by Fundación YPF- Argentina. 1 Review of Argentine Economics, hereinafter REA Alejandro E. Bunge Alejandro E. Bunge was born in 1880 and died in 1943 in Buenos Aires, Argentina4. In 1900 he went lo Germany lo finish his undergraduate studies. After having graduated as Engineer from the Royal University of Saxony in 1903, and having studied the incipient industrialisation process that was taking place in Catalonia, he returned to Argentina in 1910 where he started an impressive professional career. He got involved in the public service and in private business, as well as in the academic world. Bunge's research life was very prolific. He dedicated his life to economic studies, but the array of issues addressed by him involved different disciplines -such as demographic and sociological studies. He founded and directed the REA from 1918 until 1943, which became the most relevant economic journal and publication of the country5. Among his books, the two most important are La Economía Argentina (1930) and Una Nueva Argentina (1940). Regarding his ideological position, Bunge has been describes as a "conservative economic nationalist,6. However, he escapes traditional political and economic characterisations: neither political definition of liberal/ conservative nor economic definition of liberal/ nationalist. He was too liberal for nationalist ideology, too nationalist for liberal elite, too advanced for the
3 establishment. On the one hand, although he belonged to what can be describes as the Argentinian conservative elite, he defied the stato quo and integrated an intellectual group which promoted social and economic reformism 'from within". On the other hand, although he advocated the promotion of the national economy through diversification of production, and protectionist and import-substituting policies, he was far away from supporting economic autarchy, the closeness of the economy, the intervention of the state in private economic activity, and the rise of rentseeking economy, and also far away from rejecting foreign capital. 2 Between 1870 and 1914 Argentina experienced one of the highest growth rates in the world. 3 FALCOFF, M., "Economic Dependency in a Conservative Mirror: Alejandro Bunge and the Argentine Frustration, ", Inter-American Affairs, 35, 1982, 4, pág The main sources for Alejandro Bunge's biography are: Consejo Directivo de la REA, "Alejandro E. Bunge", Revista de Economía Argentina, 42, 1943, págs ; COGHLAN, E. A., "Un Ejemplo para las Juventudes Argentinas", Revista de Economía Argentina, 42, 1943, págs ; DE IMAZ, J. L., "Alejandro E. Bunge, Economista y Sociólogo, ", Desarrollo Económico, 55,1974, 4, págs ; RAPPOPORT, M., De Pellegrini a Martínez de Hoz: El Modelo Liberal, Buenos Aires, 1984, págs ; LLACH, J. J., La Argentina que no fue, Vol. 1, Buenos Aires,:1985, págs ; CÁRDENAS, E. J. and PAYA, C. M., La Familia de Octavio Bunge, Buenos Aires, 1995, págs ; CÁRDENAS E. J. and PAYA, C. M., La Argentina de los Hermanos Bunge, Buenos Aires, 1997, págs The shortcomings of the primary-export model 7 This economic strategy followed during the "golden age" period was really successful in terms of the growth rates achieved and the positive externalities and spillover of that growth8. Bunge explained that outstanding economic performance because of the convergence of four main factors: extensive unexploited land, immigration, foreign investment (directed mainly towards railways and basic social capital), and an important external demand for local production. However, as early as in 1908, Bunge began to point out that the aforementioned conditions were changing. After the First World War, that concern became a warning about the possibility of economic stagnation if some crucial economic reforms were not implemented. Therefore, Bunge accepted the extraordinary performance of the PEM, but suggested economic reforms in order lo achieve a sustained growth. Bunge mentioned four major changes in Argentina's environment. First of all, there was little possibility of incorporating more land to the production frontier, and therefore, there was a limit to the increase of extensive agrarian exploitation. Secondly, immigration had significantly declined because the agrarian sector was not generating enough labour opportunities9. Thirdly, the level of external demand for primary products was being threatened by increasing protectionist measures in the developed countries, especially in the United Kingdom. Finally, there was a decline in foreign investment because all major projects (social basic capital, harbours, or railways) have already been carried out. 10
4 Bunge emphasised that, because of the excessive specialisation of the economy in the exportable Pampean production, its stagnation was affecting the whole national economic activity. Moreover, he emphasised that diversification of the economy would not take place "naturally", and compared that situation with what had occurred with the transition from cattle breeding to agriculture by the end of nineteenth century11. Bunge mentioned two other main problems that arouse as a consequence of the implementation of the PEM. The first problem was that the economic growth of the "golden age" had generated a high degree of economic imbalance within the country -economic disparity among different regions 12. The second problem was that the PEM generated a high degree of vulnerability to external shocks, causing economic instability as a result. The high dependence on the imports of manufactures goods, the high concentration of exports in a few primary products and in a few external markets, and the high degree of indebtedness, converged lo generate significant external vulnerability 13. Bunge focused on the study of the Argentine economic cycles and realised about the recurrent balance of payments' crises. He concluded that Argentina faced regularly restrictions in the quantity of foreign exchange necessary to pay the high level of importsl4. Moreover, Bunge pointed out an incipient deterioration of the terms of trade. Although he could not foresee at that time a "secular deterioration of the terms of trade" -which would be addressed twenty years later by Singer and Prebisch 15. To sum up, Bunge pointed out most of the economic problems that Argentina was facing around the outbreak of the First World War, and later. He distinguished between those problems that arouse as a result of changes in the international environment, and those problems that arouse as a consequence of the implementation of the PEM. As a result, he suggested adjusting economic policy and economic institutions according lo the new environment and a new economic model. 5 Reaching a circulation of 7,500 issues by DE IMAZ, "Alejandro E. Bunge, Economista y Sociólogo ( )", pág FALCOFF, Economic Dependency in a Conservative Mirror: Alejandro Bunge and the Argentine Frustration, , pág Hereinafter PEM (primary export model). 8 By the turn of the century, Argentina was among the six countries with the highest levels of GDP per capita (together with countries like USA, UK, France, Canada, and Australia). In 1898, 1907 and 1913 Argentina was the number 10th of the world ranking because of its exports level (even higher than that of Japan, Australia, Switzerland, and Sweden). For the period , the GDP per capita grew at 3.9% per year. 9 Contrary to what it might have been expected in an agrarian economy, most of the immigration settled down in urban areas. 10 For example, the railways net had already covered nearly all the productiva area of the country. 11 That transition was possible because of the protectionist measures adopted by a reformist group within the conservative government in leaded by Carlos Pellegrini and Vicente F. López. 12 BUNC;E, A. E., Las Iiid stj-ias del Norte. Contribiicióil al Est dio de cita Niieza Politica Econóinica
5 Argentina., Vol. 1, Buenos Aires, 1922, pág (Own translation). 13 BUNCE, A. E., La Econoitiia Argentina. Política Econóniica y Adiianera, Vol. 3, Buenos Aires, 1928, pág. 30. (Own translation). 14 pág (Own translation). 15 BUNCE, A. E., "Las Fuerzas Creadoras en la Economía Nacional", Acadeiiiia Nacional de Ciencias Econóiizicas, Buenos Aires, 1927, 1, pág (Own translation). 16 BUNCE, A. E., "La Economía Positiva y la Política Económica Argentina", Rezyista de Econoinía Argentina, 1, 1918, pág (Own translation). Bunge's reformist economic development scheme As it was mentioned before, Bunge asserted that the Argentine economy would face stagnation if there were not a change in the development strategy that had been followed successfully until the First World Warl6. For him, the only way of increasing national wealth and welfare was through an increase in production. Therefore, it was crucial to create new productive activities, to foster labour creation, and lo increase productivity and efficiency. Consequently, Bunge arrived to the conclusion that it was necessary to promote the development of the internal market -which in turn would help to reduce the degree of external vulnerability-. The internal market would be developed by a more diversified production through the complementation of both intensive agrarian expansion -rather than extensive, and a greater industrialisation- mainly but not exclusively of national raw materials.quoting Bunge 17: Taking into account the big amount of foreign exchange that must be transfer each year overseas in order to pay interests and dividends of the external debt, the stagnation of one or two of them [few exports] can generate successive crises. This shows that [ ] it is extremely important that our exports include a bigger number of goods, in order lo diminish risk and, at the same time, the level of imports. Bunge clearly stated that "we have reached a high production in the cattle sector but regarding agriculture production, we can still achieve further development, especially regarding higher diversification of crops, and the promotion of farms" 18. And he added that "our policy, maintaining and improving those traditional columns of the national economy, must be directed towards the promotion of manufacture industries [ ] "19. Giving a speech in a Conference organised by the Instituto Popular de Conferencias on the 1st August 1924, he affirmed "We have to understand that this will be the last generation of importers and estancieros 20. The next generation, the one of our children, must be of manufacturers and farmers"21 Therefore,
6 he supported the promotion of both economic sectors: the agrarian sector through intensive exploitation and diversification, and the industrial sector through a rational industrial policy. Bunge's alternative development strategy, which would not take place spontaneously (laissez faire), required an urgent active role of the State through the planning and implementation of a "New Economic Policy" of industrialisation, agrarian modernisation, and the creation of new axes of development. According to Bunge, "the role of the State is indispensable to the progressive efficiency of national labour, and for the integration of the whole set of productive activities, which are becoming increasingly interconnected [ ] To sum up, Bunge proposed a reformist economic development program, which had clear differences with the PEM that had been implemented successfully until the First World War. However, it is important to mention that his program had also distinct differences with the import-substitution industrialisation strategy that would be implemented after 1940s 23. lt emphasised the complementarity between the agrarian and the industrial sectors, rather their mutual exclusion. Hence, it was certainly more rational. Next point shows that the autarchy and closeness of the economy, the over-protection -and its consequent rent-seeking behaviour, the intervention of the state in the private sector, the opposition to foreign capital and the nationalisation of foreign companies, were not among its objectives. Therefore, Bunge's strategy became like a "rational" third way between the tradicional dichotomy of PEM vs. ISI; openness vs. closeness of the economy; free-trade vs. protectionism that characterised contemporary economic policy debate BUNGE, La Economía Argentina. Política Económica y Aduanera, Vol. 3, Buenos Aires, 1928, pág. 30. (Own translation). 18 BUNGE, A. E., La Economía Argentina. La Conciencia Nacional y el Problema Económico, Vol. 1, Buenos Aires, 1928, pág. 32. (Own translation). 19 Ibid., pág. 32. (Own translation). 20 Owners of a large landed estate dedicated to cattle breeding. 21 Ibid., pág. 33. (Own translation). 22 BUNGE, A. E., "El Estado Industrial y Comerciante", Rez7ista de Econoinía Argentina, 27,1931, pág Hereinafter, ISI (import-substitution industrialisation). Bunge's ideas on industrialisation. The issue of industrialisation has always been a main concern for the historiography in its attempt of explaining that particular moment of the Argentine history in which the country took the wrong path, wasted good opportunities, and started lo move on an unexpected downhill. As Korol and Sabato assert, "the subject of industrialisation has become almost an obsession with
7 Argentines"25. Most of the historiographic studies, which have researched the issue of industrialisation, have assumed either a neo-classical standpoint or a dependency perspective. However, t is useful for this paper to identify the most important issues, which have been addressed by the literature, regarding the main obstacles for industrialisation in Argentina during the early twentieth century. On the one hand, some authors have focused on the small size of the internal market and its remote geographic position from developed nations26 ; the lack of infrastructure in transport system 27 ; the lack of technical knowledge28; the lack of mineral and energetic sources 29 ; among others. On the other hand, other authors have emphasised the lack of an insdustrial policy and the openness of the economy3o the predominance of an agrarian and free trade ideology3l; or the external dependence on the United Kingdom32 among others. Bunge has been recognised as [ ] one of the precursors, and may be the most decisive, that initiated the discourse in favour of a more industrialist orientation as the only way of fostering the sustainable progress of the nation" 33. It is important to address Bunge's industrialist ideas taking into account the ex-post historiographic debate over the aforementioned obstacles for industrialisation. It is also necessary to point out that lone of Bunge's most important contributions was the emphasis given lo the institutional framework within the economy. According to Bunge, the process of industrialisation that had taken place in Argentina showed clear signs of limitations and faced serious obstacles for development. Quoting Bunge: "The industrial development that has taken place until now, irregular and unsystematic, has achieved some importance. However, the expansive capacity of those industries is quite limited because the necessary and complementary institutions, which would foster their growth, have not yet been created,,34. If industrialisation had not gone further on was basically because of the absence of a new and stable economic policy supporting the manufacturing sector35. Although there had been some policies that benefited this sector in the past, they had not been part of a consistent and stable strategy of development36. Therefore, It was necessary a clear change in the economic model -stable in the medium term and oriented towards industrialisation. The process of industrialisation would have certain specific benefits for the Argentine economy: it would foster economic growth and increase production and wealth; it would promote new economic activities and labour opportunities37. It would reduce the dependence on external demand and also external vulnerability; and finally, it would rise the technical and
8 scientific knowledge because it was necessary the collaboration of different disciplines -such as physics, chemistry, mathematics, engineering, among others38. The main objective of the new economic policy involved the conquest of the internal market through the substitution of imports39. Although the size of the internal market in terms of population was relatively small, Bunge pointed out that in terms of consumption capacity was quite significant4o. For example, he asserted that Argentina representad half of the consumption capacity of the whole South America. Bunge mentioned the necessity of securing that internal market lo the industrial sector on a first stage, following the principle of the "infant industry"41. Regarding the type of import substitution promoted by Bunge, he gave more emphasis to the development of those "natural" industries that processed national raw materials -not only traditional agrarian commodities as grains and beef but also new industrial crops and mineral sources-. However, and for the long term, he did not discharge the development of other industries (iron and steel industry, chemical and electrical goods, among others) as far as it were possible lo undertake them in an "efficient" way. For example, Cárcano mentioned the case of Italy that managed lo develop its metallurgy efficiently even when it needed lo import the raw material from abroad. The instrument proposed by Bunge in order lo achieve the aforementioned objectives was the implementation of a "rational" protectionist tariff policy, which had lo be stable and for a period of five years. This policy implied a scale that would go from a tariff of 0% for some products, until reaching a tariff of 80% for some others42 However, Bunge rejected the closeness of the economy, its absolute prohibitionism, and the artificial protection of unadaptable industries. The final aim would be competence: "an industry that was born surrounding of an immense agrarian production and within a young and strong country must fight and compete. The competence and fight will make it efficient and powerful,43. Because of his concern about the development of the internal market, Bunge was also worried about the possibility of demographic stagnation in Argentina44. Although he underestimated the growth capacity of the Argentine population, he was right when he stated that demographic stagnation would contribute lo economic stagnation because it would keep the internal market underdeveloped. According to him, demographic stagnation was mainly the consequence of the extensive agrarian exploitation used in the countryside45. Therefore, industrialisation and the consequent generation of labour opportunities would foster
9 demographic growth, not only through an increase of the birth rate but also through the rise of immigration. Regarding the position of Argentina in the international economy, it was necessary to move closer to the United States of America and move away from the excessive specialised and dependent scheme that characterised the economic relationship with the United Kingdom. The USA had a stronger and more modern economy than the UK, and therefore, it could provide capital and the latest technology in order to promote one of the new axes of economic development: cars, oil, and roads46. This strategy would allow Argentina, among other things, to reduce transport costs and achieve greater economic and social integration of its vast geography through the diversification of production47. Bunge pointed out that the "interior" had been mainly excluded of the economic progress attained by the Pampas region -because the railway system had been extended mainly on this area, and therefore, it was essential to complement the railway system with the road network48. On the other hand, in order to reduce the excessive freight costs that were charged to the Argentine exports -and therefore lo improve external competitivity, Bunge suggested the creation of a national merchant navy-. Bunge did not propose only national economic integration but also external integration with other Latin American countries in order lo create a powerful and autonomous economic union49. This international integration would allow the Argentine industrial sector to have access lo a greater market -solving the problem of a relative small internal market-. Furthermore, it would also help lo have access lo those primary and mineral sources that were not being exploited in Argentina but in abundance in other Latin American countries50. Regarding the intervention of the State, Bunge claimed the necessity of the participation of the State in the economy: "the sum of all individual efforts will generate the essential outcome only when the State has decided lo exert a supportive and co-ordinate function"51. Bunge believed in what Llach defines as the principle of "active subsidiarity"52. The State should limit itself lo promotion and co-ordination activities, such as the promotion of technical and scientific research, a rational protectionist policy, an antidumping policy, or the regulation of economic cycles (counter-cyclical economic policy). However, he did not conceive the state as an industrial or commercial agent, competing with the private sector53. Quoting him: " [...] but if the State, because of an excess of zeal, wanted to own and manage industries, it would make a terrible mistake. It would be as if the referee, instead of being the warder of the rules of the game, pretended to play it himself,54. Moreover, Bunge asserted that "[...] the commercial or
10 industrial State ends up becoming an unfair competitor. lt starts investing capital that extracts through taxes from the society"55. Bunge stressed that some of the obstacles for a new development stage were related to what nowadays economists call "institutional framework". Social legislation was not the most adequate for the new aim of economic policy56. The fiscal regime implied a significant superposition of taxes that became a real burden on producers. The financial system channelled savings to commerce or public sector, instead of doing t towards more productive activities. Although there were an important urban-labour structure -Which could have supported a new economic policy, it was not connected to the most productive activities-. The education system did not contribute to improve technological capacity of labour structure. Finally, Bunge clearly stated that cultural change was even more important than the role of the state. Most of the main economic sectors held a position against industrialisation. Importers and ranchers predominated over manufacturers and farmers. Consumers were also against industrialisation, especially those of luxury goods who rejected national production57. Therefore, by cultural change he meant a change in favour of industrialisation. Entrepreneurs should undertake a more active and diversified investment program, and consumers should learn to valorise national production -which was actually rejected not only because of some objective disadvantages but also because a cosmopolitan and contemptuous view towards indigenous production. 24 Cavallo asserts that the aforementioned discussion remained the principal issue of the ideological and historiographic economic debate during the rest of the century. Cavallo, D. F., Volver a Crecer, Buenos Aires, 1991, pág Korol, J. C. and Ssabato, H., "Incomplete Industrialization: An Argentine Obsession", Latin American Research Review), 25, 1989, 1, pág ROCK, See D., "The Argentine Economy : some salient features", in Di Tella and Platt eds., The Political Economy of Argentina , Oxford, 1986, pág. 70; and CORTÉS CONDE, R., "La Economía de Exportación de Argentina, ", in Míguez (ed.), Anuario del IEHS, Buenos Aires 1985, pág GUERRERO, See A, La Industria Argentina. Su origen, organización y desarrollo, Buenos Aires, 1944, pág See lbid, pág.70; RAPOPORT, M. (ed.), Economía e Historia, Buenos Aires, 1988, pág. 36l; SCHVARZER, J., La Industria que Supimos Conseguir. Una historia político social de la industria argentina, Buenos Aires, 1996, pág. 75; and FERRER, A., El Devenir de Una Ilusión. La industria argentina desde 1930 hasta nuestros días, Buenos Aires, 1989, pág Guy, See D., "La Política de Carlos Pellegrini en los Comienzos de la Industrialización Argentina, ", Desarrollo Económico, 73, 1979, abril-junio, pág. 4; ROCK, "The Argentine Economy : some salient features", pág. 70; DIEGUEZ, H. L., "Argentina y Australia: Algunos Aspectos de su Desarrollo Económico", Desarrollo Económico, 32, 1969, enero-marzo, pág. 548; C.F. Díaz, Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic, New Haven and London, 1970, pág. 212; SOLBERC;, C., "Argentina y Canada: Una perspectiva Comparada sobre su Desarrollo Económico, ", Desarrollo Económico, 82, 1981, julio-septiembre, pág. 207; Ortiz, R., Historia Económica de la Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1955, págs ; Ferrer, El Devenir de Una Ilusión. La industria argentina desde 1930 hasta nuestros días, pág. 39; and Conesa, E., Los Secretos del Desarrollo, Buenos Aires, 1994, pág See FERNS, H. S., Gran Bretaña y Argentina en el siglo XIX, Buenos Aires, 1968, pág. 126; DIEGUEZ, Argentina y Australia: Algunos Aspectos de su Desarrollo Económico, pág. 551; FERRER, A., La Economía Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1964, pág. 182; DIAZ Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic, pág. 215; O'CONNELL, A. "Comentarios", in Argentina y Australia, Buenos Aires, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, 1979, pág. 63.
11 31 See GUERRERO, La Industria Argentina. Su origen, organización y desarrollo, pág. 7O; ORTIZ, Historia Económica de la Argentina, pág. 121; DIAZ Alejandro, Essays on the Econoinic History of the Argentine Republic, pág. 214; SOLBERG, Argentina y Canadá: Una perspectiva Comparada sobre su Desarrollo Económico, , pág. 211; ROCK, The Argentine Economy : some salient features, pág. 70; PEÑA, M., La Clase Dirigente Argentina frente al Imperialismo, Buenos Aires, 1973, págs. 29~32; MURMIS, M. and PORTANTIERO, J. C., Estudios sobre los Orígenes del Peronismo, Buenos Aires, 1971, pág See FERNS, Gran Bretaña y Argentina en el siglo XIX; PEÑA, La Clase Dirigente Argentina frente al Imperialismo, pág. 36; CORNBILT, O., CALLO, E.. et al., "La Generación del 80 y su proyecto: antecedentes y consecuencias", Desarrollo Económico, 4, 1962, enero-marzo, pág. 41; RAPOPORT (ed.), Economía e Historia, pág. 259; SCHVARZER, La Industria que Supimos Conseguir. Una historia político social de la industria argentina, pág. 147; GIUDICI, E., Imperialismo Inglés y Liberación Nacional, Buenos Aires, 1984, pág. 55; JORGE, E. Industria y Concentración Económica. Desde principios de siglo hasta el peronismo, Buenos Aires, 1986, pág. 19; FRIGERIO, R., Estatuto del Subdesarrollo, Buenos Aires, 1983, pág Comisión de Homenaje, "Alejandro E. Bunge, Fundador y Director de la Revista de Economía Argentina", Revista de Economía Argentina, 43, 1944, 311 pág Speech given by Ernesto L. Herbin, representing the Argentine Factory of Electrical Products. 34 BUNGE, A. E., Las Fuerzas Creadoras en la Economía Nacional, pág Ibid., pág BUNGE, A. E., La Nueva Política Económica Argentina. Introducción al estudio de la industria nocional, Buenos Aires, 1921, págs BUNGE, A. E., "La actual no es una Crisis del Comercio sino una Crisis del Trabajo Nacional", Revista de Economía Argentina, 16, 1926, pág BUNGE, A. E., "Nueva Orientación de la Política Económica Argentina", Revista de Economía Argentina, 1, 1918, págs BUNGE, A. E., "Los Capitales y la Eficiencia en la Producción Nacional", Revista de Economía Argentina, 19, 1927, pág BUNGE, A. E., "Puede aún Remediarse a Corto Plazo, la Actual Grave Crisis del Trabajo Nacional", Revista de Economía Argentina, 17, 1926, pág BUNGE, A. E., "La Política Económica que Conviene a Brasil y la Argentina", Revista de Economía Argentina, 24, 1930, pág BUNGE, A. E., "Los Socialistas adoptan el Proteccionismo", Revista de Economía Argentina, 16, 1926, pág Ibid., págs BUNGE, A. E., "Varios Problemas de la Economía Nacional", in Boletín de Extensión Universitaria, Buenos Aires, 1919, pág CÁRCANO, M. A., "organización de la Producción. La pequeña propiedad y el crédito agrícola", Revista de Economía Argentina, 1, 1918, pág BUNGE, A. E., "La Financiación de Caminos y la Venta de Automóviles y Otras Manufacturas Americanas en la Argentina", Revista de Economía Argentina, 16, 1926, pág BUNGE, A. E., Las Industrias del Norte. Contribución al Estudio de una Nueva Política Económica Argentina, Vol. 1, pág BUNGE, A. E., La Economía Argentina. La Conciencia Nacional y el Problema Económico, Vol. 1, Buenos Aires, 1928, pág BUNGE thought about what it was later known as "economic union", including a free trade area, custom union, and even the possibility of a monetary union. 50 BUNGE, A. E., Una Nueva Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1940, chapter 12, pág BUNGE, A. E., "El Porvenir de la República Argentina", Revista de Economía Argentina, 9,1922, pág LLACH, La Argentina que no fue, Vol. 1, Buenos Aires, IDES, 1985, pág. 22. Conclusion First of all, Bunge pointed out most of the economic problems that Argentina faced during the inter-war period, and suggested adjusting economic policy and economic institutions according to the new environment and a new economic model.