EAE-334A: ORGANIZACION INDUSTRIAL 2do Semestre 2006

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1 INSTITUTO DE ECONOMIA PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE CHILE EAE-334A: ORGANIZACION INDUSTRIAL 2do Semestre 2006 Prof.: Juan-Pablo Montero, Este es un curso de postgrado de organización industrial; una rama de la microeconomía que se preocupa fundamentalmente de entender como funcionan y se organizan empresas y mercados. El objetivo del curso es entregar un tratamiento de temas e industrias que sean relevantes y actuales y que además introduzcan a los alumnos a técnicas que puedan eventualmente usar en sus tesis de investigación. El curso presenta un balance (aunque un poco sesgado) entre modelos teóricos y trabajos empíricos. El curso supone que los alumnos tienen un conocimiento de teoría microeconómica (al nivel de Micro I), teoría de juegos y algo de econometría (Green s Econometric Analysis es más que suficiente). El texto principal del curso es The Theory of Industrial Organization de Jean Tirole (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1988). Este texto entrega una visión muy completa de casi todos los temas teóricos que veremos en el curso. Textos de pregrado que pueden servir de apoyo en sólo algunos temas son Industrial Organization de Oz Shy (MIT Press, 1995) y Modern Industrial Organization de Carlton and Perloff (Harper Collins, 1994). También se recomienda el Handbook of Industrial Organization, edited by R. Schmalensee and R. Willing, Volumes I and II, North-Holland Tirole, que está en Biblioteca, será complementado con varios artículos de revistas (posiblemente algunos serán indicados más adelante en forma oportuna). Todas las lecturas marcadas con un asteristco (*) son lecturas requeridas y se espera que el alumno las lea antes de la clase respectiva. La mayoría de las lecturas están disponibles ya sea en JSTOR.ORG (vía Biblioteca PUC) o en la colección electrónica de la Biblioteca. La evaluación del curso consistirá en dos documentos referato de algún paper (30%) y presentación escrita y oral de una propuesta de investigación (30%) y participación en clases (40%). PROGRAMA I. INTRODUCCION Qué es la organización industrial? Conocimientos básicos de teoría de juegos (*) Tirole, Introduction, p

2 Schmalensee, R. (1988), Industrial economics: An overview, Economic Journal 98, (*) Tirole, Cap. 11, Game Theory User s Manual, II. COMPETENCIA ESTATICA (*) Tirole, Sección 2.1 y Cap. 5. F. Fisher (1989), Games economists play: A noncooperative view, RAND Journal of Economics 20 (Spring), (*) D. Kreps and J. Scheinkman (1983), Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes, Bell (now RAND) Journal of Economics 14 (Autumn), Klemperer, P. and M. Meyer (1989), Supply function equilibria in oligopoly under uncertainty, Econometrica Evidencia Empírica (*) T. Bresnahan (1982), The oligopoly solution concept is identified, Economic Letters 10, T. Bresnahan (1987), Empirical studies of industries with market power, in Handbook of Industrial Organization. (*) D. Genesove and W. Mullin (1998), Testing static oligopoly models: Conduct and cost in the sugar industry, , RAND Journal of Economics (Summer), (*) Wolfram, C. (1999), Measuring duopoly power in the British electricity spot market, American Economic Review. (*) Wolfram, C. (1998), Strategic bidding in a multi-unit auction, RAND Journal of Economics 29, III. COMPETENCIA DINAMICA/COLUSION (*) Tirole, Cap. 6 Colusión con demanda observable 2

3 (*) J. Rotember and G. Saloner (1986), A super-game theoretic model of price wars during booms, American Economic Review 76 (June), Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991), The impact of cyclical demand movements, RAND Journal of Economics Colusión con monitoreo imperfecto (*) E. Green and R. Porter (1984), Non-cooperative collusion under imperfect price information, Econometrica 52 (January), Abreu, D., D. Pearce and E. Stachetti (1990), Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring, Econometrica, Colusión con borde competitivo (*) Montero, J.-P. and J.I. Guzmán (2006), Welfare-enhancing collusion in the presence of a competitive fringe, working paper ( Colusión con restricciones de capacidad/contratos forward (*) Liski, M. and J.P. Montero (2006), Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly, Journal of Economci Theory, forthcoming Compte, O., F. Jenny and P. Rey (2002), Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion, European Economic Review, Contacto multimercado (*) B.D. Bernheim and M.D. Whinston (1990), Multimarket contact and collusive behaviour, RAND Journal of Economics 21 (Spring), Colusión con información privada (*) McAfee, P. and J. McMillan (1992), Bidding rings, American Economic Review 82, (*) Athey, S., K. Bagwell and C. Sanchirico (2002), Collusion and price rigidity, Review of Economic Studies Colusión y políticas antimonopolio Whinston, M.D, Lectures on Antitrust Economics, MIT Press, forthcoming, caps. 1 y 2. 3

4 Harrington, J (2004), Cartel pricing dynamics in the presence of an antitrust authority, RAND Journal of Economics, Evidencia (*) R. Porter (1983), A study of cartel stability: The Joint Executive Committee, , Bell Journal of Economics 14 (Autumn), (*) Röller, L.-H.and F. Steen (2006), On the workings of a cartel: Evidence from the Norwegian cement industry, American Economic Review 96, (*) Borenstein, S. and A. Shepard (1996), Dynamic pricing in retail gasoline markets, RAND Journal of Economics, G. Ellison (1994), Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee, RAND Journal of Economics 25 (Spring), Knittel, C. and V. Stango (2003), Price ceilings as focal points for tacit collusion: Evidence from credit cards, American Economic Review 93 (December), IV. MODELOS DE DIFERENCIACION DE PRODUCTOS (*) Tirole, Cap. 2 y 7 H. Hotelling (1929), Stability in competition, Economic Journal 39 (March), A. Dixit and J. Stiglitz (1977), Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity, American Economic Review 67 (June), A. Shaked and J. Sutton (1982), Relaxing price competition through product differentiation, Review of Economic Studies 49, Evidencia (con mayoritaría participación del Prof. Francisco Gallego; en consecuencia, contenidos pueden cambiar) (*) Bresnahan (1987), Competition and collusion in the American automobile industry: The 1955 price war, Journal of Industrial Economics 35 (June), (?) Berry, S. (1994), Estimating discrete-choice models of product differentiation, RAND Journal of Economics (?) Berry, S., J. Levinsohn and A. Pakes (1995), Automobile prices in market equilibrium, Econometrica 63 (July),

5 (?) Nevo, A. (2001), Measuring market power in the ready-to-eat cereal industry, Econometrica (?) Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (2004), Differentiated products demand systems from a combination of micro and macro data: The new car market, Journal of Political Economy, Otros (??) por anunciar más adelante V. ENTRADA Entrada y estructura de mercado (*) Tirole, Secciones 8.1 y 8.2 B. Jovanovic (1982), Selection and the evolution of industry, Econometrica (May), J. Sutton (1991), Sunk Costs and Market Structure, MIT Press, Chapters 1-2. S. Berry and J. Waldfogel (1999), Free entry and social inefficiency in radio broadcasting, RAND Journal of Economics 30 (Autumn), Estrategias para prevenir entrada (*) Tirole, (*) P. Aghion and P. Bolton (1987), Contracts as a barrier to entry, American Economic Review 77 (June), R. Schmalensee (1978), Entry deterrence in the ready-to-eat break cereal industry, RAND Journal of Economics 9, (*) J. Chevalier (1995), Capital structure and product market competition: Empirical evidence from the supermarket industry, American Economic Review 85 (June), VI. DISCRIMINACION Y DISPERSION DE PRECIOS Monopolista y bienes durables (*) Tirole, Cap. 1. (incluyendo Suplementary Section) 5

6 Bulow (1982), Durable goods monopolists, Journal of Political Economy 15, R. Coase (1972), Durability and monopoly, Journal of Law and Economics 15, L. Ausubel and R. Deneckere (1989), Reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly, Econometrica 57 (May), S203-S232. Salant, S.W. (1976), Exhaustible resources and industrial structure: A Nash-Cournot approach to the world oil market, Journal of Political Economy 84, Liski, M. and J.-P. Montero (2006), Market power in a storable-good market: Theory and applications to carbon and sulfur trading, working paper MIT-CEEPR ( Waldman, M. (2003), Durable goods theory for real world markets, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, Dispersión de precios, búsqueda, y costos de cambio (*) H. Varian (1980), A model of sales, American Economic Review 70, P. Kemplerer (1987), The competitiveness of markets with switching costs, RAND Journal of Economics 18 (Spring), Discriminación de precios (*) Tirole, Cap. 3. Varian (1980), Price discrimination and social welfare, American Economic Review 75. (*) R.P. McAfee, J. McMillan and M. Whinston (1989), Multiproduct monopoly, commodity bundling an correlation of values, Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (May), W. Oi (1971), A Disneyland dilemma: Two-part tariffs for a Mickey-Mouse monopoly, Quarterly Journal of Economics 85, Discriminación de precios en oligopolio (*) Stole, L. (1995), Nonlinear pricing and oligopoly, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, (*) Ellison, G. (2005), A model of add-on pricing, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Evidencia 6

7 (*) A. Sorenson (2000), Equilibrium price dispersion in retail markets for prescription drugs, Journal of Political Economy 108 (August). (*) S. Borenstein and N. Rose (1994), Competition and price dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry, Journal of Political Economy 102 (August), (*) A. Shepard (1991), Price discrimination and retail configuration, Journal of Political Economy 99 (February), VII. INFORMACION ASIMETRICA (*) Tirole, Cap. 9 P. Milgron and J. Roberts (1986), Limit pricing and entry under incomplete information: An equilibrium analysis, Econometrica 50 (March), Evidencia (*) D. Genesove (1993), Adverse selection in the wholesale used car market, Journal of Political Economy 101 (August), T. Hubbard (1998), An empirical examination of moral hazard in the vehicle inspection market, RAND Journal of Economics 29 (Summer),