THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX A PARASITE ON SPANISH ECONOMY REPORT. no. 1 2

Transcripción

1 THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX A PARASITE ON SPANISH ECONOMY REPORT no. 1 2

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3 REPORT no. 1 2 THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX A parasite on Spanish economy Pere Ortega Camino Simarro Centre d Estudis per la Pau J.M. Delàs Justícia i Pau Barcelona, April 2012

4 Centre d Estudis per la Pau JM Delàs Justícia i Pau Rivadeneyra 6, 10è Barcelona T F delas@justiciaipau.org info@centredelas.org Barcelona, April 2012 Graphic design: Fundació Tam-Tam D.L.: B ISSN: The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy

5 REPORT no. 12 THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX A PARASITE ON SPANISH ECONOMY Index 1. INTRODUCTION MILITARY PRODUCTION IN SPAIN A SHORT HISTORY OF THE MILITARY INDUSTRY IN SPAIN SOME SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE SECTOR DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL SUBSECTORS THE ARMS OLIGOPOLY...12 Navantia...12 EADS-Casa...14 General Dynamics Santa Bárbara...16 INDRA THE SPANISH MILITARY INDUSTRY IN THE WORLD RANKING WHO IS WHO IN THE SPANISH MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX TEMPORARY RECEIVERSHIP OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND THE ARMS BUBBLE THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AS A CHANCE FOR CONVERSION...22 APPENDIX...25 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The military-industrial complex in Spain is based on an oligopoly made up of four big companies that provide all the weapons that the Ministry of Defence uses for its armies. EADS-Casa manufactures aeronautics for the air force; Navantia produces warships for the navy; Santa Bárbara/General Dynamics sells heavy and small arms to the army and, last but not least, Indra provides all the aforementioned armed forces and their weapons with most of the electronics and new technologies. These four companies make up between 75 and 80% of the turnover of military production which amounted to approximately E 6.6 billion in That represented 1.24% of the national industrial production and 1.1% of the work force of the Spanish industry employing about 29,000 people in the defence manufacture. Moreover, the intense cooperation between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Industry, facilitated through a creative financial mechanism inaugurated in 1996, and the commitments undertaken by the Ministry of Defence for the development of big programmes for new weaponry caused a bubble in the production of arms. This situation brought both the Ministry of Defence and the State an accumulated debt of about E37bn that cannot be paid off and that only increases the debt of the public Treasury that is currently in quite a bad state. Both statistics and economic-financial data show the inefficiency of the military industry. In order to reduce the negative impact of the military industry on the whole Spanish economy it is therefore necessary to take action from multiple directions: firstly, the number of troops in the armed forces must be reduced to lower the demand for arms; the purchase and participation in joint programmes for new weaponry have to be halted; the Ministry of Industry must stop granting credits to companies for military Research and Development (R&D); finally, studies must be made into the conversion of military industries into civil production to avoid the loss of employment and create a positive impact on social wellbeing. 5 The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy

6 Index of tables Table 1. Defence turnover and employment by subsector (2009) Table 2. Navantia commercial activity ( )...14 Table 3. Subsidies given to Navantia ( )...14 Table 4. Subsidies given to EADS-Casa ( )...15 Table 5. Subsidies given to Indra ( )...18 Table 6. Credits given to Indra ( )...18 Table 7. The Spanish military industry in the world ranking (2009)...19 Graphic 1. Sales by Defence subsectors (2009)...13 Graphic 2. Employment by Defence subsectors (2009)...13 Appendix Table 1. Military companies in Spain Table 2. Main military contracts Table 3. Aerospatial Sector (2009)...28 Table 4. Naval Sector (2009)...29 Table 5. Electronics and Communications (2009)...29 Table 6. Military vehicles (Armoured and land platforms) (2009) Table 7. Engineering (2009)...30 Table 8. Weaponry and ammunitions (2009)...31 Table 9. Turnover balance by company ( )...31 Table 10. Sales by company ( )...32 Table 11. Employment by company ( )...32 Table 12. Military R&D in Spain ( )...33 Table 13. Directory of companies and military industries and acronyms...34 Map 1. The military industry network with the state and financial groups The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy

7 REPORT no. 12 THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX A PARASITE ON SPANISH ECONOMY Pere Ortega Coordinator of the Delàs Center for Peace Studies Camino Simarro Researcher at the Delàs Center for Peace Studies The Spanish military industry has caused a bubble in the sector of arms production that the Ministry of Defence cannot assume EADS-Casa, Navantia, Indra and General Dynamics/ Santa Bárbara occupy high positions in the world ranking of military industry 1. INTRODUCTION This report examines the Spanish military industry and analyzes its impact on the Spanish economy, an impact which is not positive; it is in fact worsening the economic crisis that the Spanish state is currently experiencing. As shown in the report, the military industry in Spain has contributed to the increase of the public debt and caused a bubble in the sector of arms production that the Ministry of Defence cannot assume. In the three following sections the report analyses the military industry in Spain, its history and the main changes that have occurred in the sector during the last years. In order to deepen the analysis of the military industrial sector, the fifth section includes figures from defence subsectors, which show the existence of what we call the arms oligopoly in the sixth section. This oligopoly shows the internationalisation of the world military industry and the role of Spain in its globalisation. In the seventh section we will see that the four Spanish companies that comprise the oligopoly (EADS-Casa, Navantia, Indra and General Dynamics/Santa Bárbara) occupy high positions in the world ranking of military industry. We also wanted to show what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex, some of the hidden interests lying behind military industry. Knowing who is who in this field will help us understand why the Ministry of Defence has committed itself to enormous contracts that were recognised as unnecessary. The two final sections show the results of an inefficient industry and provide data on a possible conversion of the military industry to civil production. Finally, the Annex includes twelve tables with figures divided by company, subsectors, contracts, R&D and a map of the network existing between the state, financial groups and the main Spanish military industries to show the dependency of the military industries both on the Spanish state and on financial institutions or private groups. All data included in the report was extracted from the balances of the companies or from the SABI database and compared to that of the Trade Register. Most of it corresponds to Nonetheless, the balances, with the exception of the big companies (EADS-Casa, Navantia, Indra, General Dynamics, Sener, Amper, Eurocopter and ITP), do not offer information about the percentage represented by military production in the company s gross production or the number of employed people working in the military sector. For this reason we opted for the information provided by some secondary sources 1 to gain access to these figures. The end result is that the data we provide here, though not exactly precise, offers a representative approach to the reality of the sector. This report completes other studies by the Study Center for Peace J.M. Delàs devoted to analysing each one of the elements that make up what we know as the arms cycle or the military-economic cycle, made up by the military expenditure of the Spanish state, the research (R&D) with military objectives, the military industry, the arms trade and the end use of the arms. As we will see, the military industry is one of 1. See Table 1 of the Annex. 7 The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy

8 About 500 companies currently provide their services and arms to the Ministry of Defence The Spanish government contributes to the secrecy through the Law on arms trade, which only details the number of exports by the country to which they are sold, without specifying who the producer is or the type of exported arms the most relevant factors of the whole military economic cycle. 2. MILITARY PRODUCTION IN SPAIN About 500 companies currently provide their services and arms to the Ministry of Defence. This report only cites seventy companies that are undoubtedly the most important manufacturers 2 of arms or arms components. It analyses the period between 2009 and As we explained, figures come from the balances provided by the companies or the SABI database compared with those of the Trade Register. The defence production percentages were obtained from these balances or from the secondary sources listed in Table 1 of the Annex. Almost all data included in the tables corresponds to 2009 because the 2010 results of most companies are not yet available and, in some cases, the information from 2009 was not found. In these cases we included the 2008 data. This count allows us to approach the real figure of the annual military production in Spain related to the number of employed people, sales and the results of the companies. Table 1 of the Annex: Military companies in Spain 2009, includes detailed information about sales, results and employment of the seventy analysed companies. Yet it offers scant information about the export of military material. This is the consequence of the deficient when not inexistent information provided by the companies due to the secrecy involved in all exports of military material. The Spanish government actually contributes to this secrecy through the Law on arms trade 3, which only details the number of exports by the country to which they are sold, without specifying who the producer is or the type of exported arms. 2. A more complete list can be found at Military industry in Spain, with an Index of all the more relevant industries with their names and acronyms as well as the type of production and its percentage devoted to the defence sector. 3. LAW 53/2007, 28th of December, about the control of the defence and dual-use material exports. Among the cited companies we included two, Defex and Isdefe, 100% of whose activity takes place in the military sector and which provide services rather than products. Isdefe is a consulting firm that provides technological services and advice to the military industry. However, we did not include the Compañía Española de Seguros de Crédito a la Exportación (Spanish Company of Credit Insurance for Exports, CESCE) which, as the map in the Annex shows, ly depends on the Ministry of Economy. As its name suggests CESCE insures exportation operations, including all arms exported abroad. In 2010 these arms exports only represented 0.6% of the exports according to the report on arms trade that the Study Centre for Peace J.M. Delàs publishes each year 4. This low percentage shows the irrelevance of the controversial Spanish arms exports to Spanish foreign trade as a whole and also shows that its reduction or removal would not represent a disaster for the Spanish economy. Furthermore, we did not analyse companies that provide services and consumption goods (such as clothes, food, etc.) as they are not considered part of military industry. Map 1 in the Annex shows the importance of the public sector managed by the Spanish government which, through the Ministry of Defence or the SEPI, holds significant interests in the military-industrial sector. Through INTA (the National Institute of Aerospace Technology) the Ministry of Defence owns 100% of Isdefe and INSA through which it has a firm control of Hisdesat, Hispasat (both dedicated to military satellites) and Xtar (for military communications). For its part, SEPI has important interests in Hispasat, EADS-Casa and Iberia (which provides maintenance of military aircrafts); and through 100% of Navantia it owns 51% shares in SAES and Sainsel (which provides warship components), 20% in Inmize (missile producers) and 51% 4. Font, T. and Benítez, F. (2011), The controversial Spanish arms trade, a secret business Centre Delàs. Available at: attachments/804_informe9_eng.pdf 8 The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy

9 in Defex. The autonomous government of Andalusia also holds 19.9% shares in Alestis, a company that manufactures components in carbon fibre which it sells to EADS-Casa. As for the private sector, the map shows the strong interests of the financial institutions, banks and saving banks, as well as some venture capital financial groups, in military companies. They are all reported to illustrate and provide information about the private interests involved in the Spanish financial sector. According to the available data the defence sector production amounted to E 6.6 billion in 2009, a figure that might be higher if we could access detailed information and if we included many other small companies providing defence material. The value of this industry only represents 1.24% of the industrial production of the State 5. With regards to employment, the companies do not distinguish between civil or military work, so we applied the percentage assigned to production in the defence sector. In this way we estimate that about 29,020 people work for military companies, which is 1.11% of the workforce employed by Spanish industry (in relation to the data provided by the INE). As such, the Spanish military-industrial sector has little importance either to industrial production or job creation, the main arguments used by those who defend the military industry. This data shows a certain recovery of the sector with respect to our previous study 6. This recovery was caused by the increase of the projects for new weaponry implemented by the Ministry of Defence in the mid-90s, projects that have been significantly increased in recent years. Yet this recovery should start decreasing as a consequence of the progressive readjustments made to the state budget 5. Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2010), Panorámica de la Industria., INE. 6. Ortega, P. (2007), La ineficiencia de la industria de guerra, i Oliveres, A. and Ortega, P. (2007) El militarismo en España, Barcelona, Icaria. as a result of the crisis by the Socialist government in 2010 and 2011 and by the new right-wing government since the beginning of These readjustments also affect the Ministry of Defence though less than other ministries. Among the companies showing negative turnovers at the end of the year Navantia, EADS-Casa and Santana Motor S.A. stand out, all of which are public or partly owned by the state. However, a significant proportion of the private industry s companies also registered losses or very meagre benefits, a fact that challenges the idea that the military industry is profitable. 3. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE MILITARY INDUSTRY IN SPAIN The state founded after the end of the Spanish civil war ( ) implemented a process of industrial promotion and in 1941 it funded the Instituto Nacional de Industria (National Institute for Industry, INI), a public holding to serve the nation by promoting and funding the creation, transformation or re-founding of all kinds of industries and especially of those related to the country s defence. The objective was to reach economic autarky by strengthening national military industry in order to be independent of foreign trade on an issue that was considered to be vital: national defence. In this way Franco s dictatorship wanted to emulate Hitler s Germany, whose economic growth had been based on military industry. So the INI was created as a tool to promote Spanish industrialisation through the military sector. Three important manufacturing centres were built: Empresa Nacional Bazán (currently named Navantia) for supplies for the navy; Construcciones Aeronáuticas S.A. (CASA, currently named EADS-Casa) for the aviation material necessary to the air force; and the Empresa Nacional Santa Bárbara (ENSB, currently named General Dynamics Santa Bárbara) for the weapons of the army. As the techniques applied to the military products required it, in 1970 the INI extended its support to other sectors: the Cen- The Spanish militaryindustrial sector has little importance either to industrial production or job creation, the main arguments used by those who defend the military industry The defence sector production amounted to E6.6 billion in 2009, which only represents 1.24% of the industrial production of the State 9 The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy

10 The INI (National Institute for Industry) was created as a tool to promote Spanish industrialisation through the military sector After the entry of Spain into NATO in May 1982 the Minister of Defence Narcís Serra decided to modernise the armed forces and their weapons tro de Estudios Técnicos de Materiales Especiales (CETME); the Empresa Nacional de Autocamiones S.A. (ENASA), which manufactures Pegaso trucks for the Army; and Experiencias Industriales S.A. (EISA), Empresa Nacional de Óptica S.A. (ENOSA) and Equipos Electrónicos S.A (EESA), in the field of electronics. Together with the public-owned companies there were several private companies in the defence sector, such as Placencia de las Armas (afterwards called SAPA Placencia); the short-arms producers Bonifacio Exhevarría Star, Gabilondo and Cía. Llama and Unceta and Cía. Astra; and then Instalaza, Esperanza and Cía., Unión Española de Explosivos (currently named Maxam) which, together with Explosivos Alaveses (EXPAL), Explosivos de Burgos and Fabricaciones Extremeñas manufactured explosives to supply part of the small and light weapons as well as the ammunition and explosives to the Spanish Armed Forces. Finally, CE- SELSA was the most important private electronics company in the defence sector. Later, after the entry of Spain into NATO in May 1982 and after the arrival of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) to government, the Minister of Defence Narcís Serra decided to modernise the armed forces and their weapons. This meant an increase to the budget. This policy was implemented with the participation of Spain in international programs through the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) since Another important element was the promotion of the electronics industry for the defence sector through the creation of the Group INISEL (Empresa Nacional de Electrónica y Sistemas) in 1985 to unite the electronics companies INI, ENASA, EISA and EESA. In 1986 the Law for the Promotion and Coordination of Scientific and Technical Research (Ley de Fomento y Coordinación de la Investigación Científica y Técnica) was approved and a general framework was created to promote and coordinate the state s research activity. Projects for new weapons to supply to the Ministry of Defence were given preferential treatment. 7 During the 1990s neoliberal economic policies became more and more prevalent in industrialised countries. These policies were accompanied by a wave of privatisations of public companies as a consequence of the liberalising spirit that pervaded the world economy in so-called Globalisation. These politics were also implemented in Spain and affected the Spanish military industry through the privatization of publicowned companies. In 1992 INISEL merged with CESELSA and became INDRA, which was charged by the state with the electronic development of most of its weapons (armoured vehicles, aircrafts and warships). In 2000 CASA merged with the European Aeronautic Defence and Space (EADS) consortium, being controlled by the INI, currently named Sociedad Española de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI), which owns 5,5% of its shares. Finally in July 2001 Santa Bárbara Sistemas was acquired by the American General Dynamics. Navantia (formerly named Izar and before that Industria Nacional Bazán) is still a SEPI public-owned company due to losses in the millions. After the end of the Cold War the military industry was affected by a slowing process. Still, in the mid-nineties the US, Russia and the European Union including Spain- spurred the world arms market. In the Spanish case we also have to highlight that the most important client of the military industry, the Ministry of Defence, kept increasing its demand for new weapons year after year 8 for its entrance into NATO. The Spanish military industry has been consolidating since 2002, and especially the four main companies: EADS-Casa, Santa Bárbara, already absorbed by General Dynamics, Indra and particularly the public-owned Navantia, which were all benefited by new 7. For more information about the development of the military industry in Spain see Manonellas, M and Xarles, G. (2000), La industria armamentista: pérdidas públicas y beneficios privados, in Oliveres, A. and Ortega P. (2000), El ciclo armamentista español, Barcelona, Icaria. 8. See Table 2 in the Annex. 10 The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy

11 very relevant contracts assigned by the Ministry of Defence. Nowadays these four companies are still very dependent on the Ministry of Defence, just as they were in the past. 4. SOME SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE SECTOR It is particularly noteworthy that the Spanish government decided to sign the agreement of the European Defence Agency (EDA) that was created in the European Union to smooth the trade and circulation of military products among its member states on the 13th of June The Spanish government, in agreement with Afarmade (formerly the military industries association) decided to adhere to the EDA s protocol that ruled that all competitions above E1bn had to be made public through the EDA. At the same time the government and Afarmade became aware of a clause of the EDA s protocol that rules that states can decide, for reasons of national security, not to submit some military contracts to public competition. As a consequence, Spanish companies that want to be protected, such as Navantia, can keep being favoured with respect to other European competitors. Afarmade announced its dissolution as an association after 24 years in September 2009 due to the discontent of the most relevant arms industries, such as Navantia and EADS-Casa, who considered their interests not properly defended. The result was the creation of a new association named Asociación Española de Tecnologías de Defensa, Aeronáutica y Espacio (TEDAE), which the rest of the companies of the sector joined as partners and named the former Minister of Defence of the last socialist government of Felipe González, Julián García Vargas as their highest representative. A significant change also occurred in the property of the Unión Española de Explosivos (UEE), that was later named MaxamCorp. It is a holding of six companies, among them Explosivos Alaveses (Expal), a company of the subsector of the ammunition and explosives field that despite the closing of its factory in Vitoria, kept its commercial name and moved its production to other subsidiaries such as Explosivos de Burgos (EDB), Fabricaciones Extremeñas (FAEX) and Fabricaciones Metalúrgicas de Albacete. Expal is a company that manufactures and exports bombs and explosives. In the past it manufactured cluster bombs and anti-personnel mines, which are today prohibited for the indiscriminate damages they cause on civil population. In June 2006 Francisco Torrente was appointed to be Expal s president. Mr. Torrente is a former admiral of the Spanish Army who, just a few months earlier, was the Secretary General of Defence (Segenpol). After this appointment the contracts of Expal with the Ministry of Defence increased significantly, to the point that Expal overcame the crisis that had forced it to close its factory in Vitoria and acquired another one in Santa Bárbara, in the autonomous region of Murcia, on land that was owned by the Ministry of Defence. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that was signed in March 2010 by the Minister of Defence Carme Chacón and her Israeli counterpart, Ehud Barak to promote military cooperation, technology exchange and R&D in the defence sector between the two countries is also noteworthy. Such an exchange benefits Israel especially as by entering the Spanish market it ensures a profitable platform to reach other markets such as Latin America and Africa and also because it owns more advanced military technology than Spain. Currently most of the exchanges between the two countries consist of sending components of Spanish arms to be transformed by the Israeli military industries and then be sent back to Spain to integrate them into Spanish weapons. It is the case of the aircraft EF-2000 (Eurofighter), missiles and Tigre helicopters among others. The two countries also signed an international Agreement in 2011 which classifies the information about transactions made in the military industrial sector, trade, R&D and exchanges of technology. These agreements build an alliance to protect the military cooperation between Spain and Israel. In February 2011 the government of the autonomous region of Andalusia In 2007 Spain sign an agreement of the European Defence Agency (EDA) A clause in the EDA s protocol rules that states can decide, for reasons of national security, not to submit some military contracts to public competition 11 The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy

12 Carme Chacón and her Israeli counterpart, Ehud Barak, signed a MoU to promote military cooperation, technology exchange and R&D in the defence sector between the two countries The case of Santana Motor is a good example of the inefficiency of the military industries that depend on the State decided to close Santana Motor that used to manufacture Anibal all-terrain vehicles and sell them to the Ministry of Defence. It was decided after ten years of continuous losses that amounted to E270m. Santana Motor was owned entirely by the government of Andalusia and the company employed some 1,090 people. The Ministry of Defence cancelled the contract of the Anibal vehicles after finding serious irregularities in their functioning and this brought the company towards its closure. The case of Santana Motor is a good example of the inefficiency of the military industries that depend on the State. 5. DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL SUBSECTORS The analysis of the whole militaryindustrial sector offers more information if it is made by defence subsectors as this demonstrates the existence of what we are going to name the arms oligopoly. To make such an analysis it is necessary to point out that some companies work in different subsectors. In these cases we opted to review them under the subsector in which they place themselves. 9 In this way the aerospace subsector has the most significant turnover and employment rate of the whole defence sector as EADS-Casa is the biggest company of the Spanish military industry. The aerospace subsector is followed by the naval subsector, in this case for the enormous importance of Navantia. Indra is the leading company in electronics and communications while General Dynamics/Santa Bárbara stands out in the field of vehicles and armoured vehicles. The engineering sector is more divided as a number of companies compete in a more balanced way. Yet Isdefe stands out in this field. It is worth mentioning that some of the companies included in this subsector could actually be found in the electronics subsector and vice-versa. Finally the subsector of the production of weapons and ammunition is leaded by Expal, of the Maxam group. Table 1 and graphics 1 and 2 9. See the Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Annex for the breakdown of the analysed companies for each subsector identified of the defence industry. show the turnover and employment rates of each subsector of the defence field. The highest turnover and employment rate is not represented by the electronics sector, although it could be said that it offers the highest added value in technology and is the most competitive in the market of new technologies, as shown by the growth of companies such as Indra, Amper, Sener, GMV o Tecnobit. 6. THE ARMS OLIGOPOLY After analysing military production both as a whole and by subsector we can see that the four important companies of the Spanish military industry (Navantia, Indra, EADS-Casa and General Dynamics/Santa Bárbara) represented 75.4% of the military turnover and 74% of the work force of the whole military industrial sector in 2009, similar to former decades. Each one of the reviewed companies actually monopolises every military industrial subsector: EADS-Casa in aerospace; General Dynamics/Santa Bárbara in armoured vehicles and light arms; INDRA monopolises electronics and Navantia the naval sector. We thus find that these four companies make up the oligopoly of arms production of the Spanish military-industrial complex. We are now going to provide the most significant data about each one of these companies. Navantia Empresa Nacional Bazán was created in Its mission was to produce all kinds of military vessels and naval arms for warships of the Spanish Army. In 1998, due to the high losses registered throughout its existence the company never made a profit- Bazán implemented a plan to rationalise the company and significantly reduced its staff. Afterwards in December 2000 under the right-wing government of the Partido Popular, it merged with the national company Astilleros Españoles S. A. (AESA) with civil production, and was named IZAR. The reason of the merger was the bankruptcy of the AESA civil shipyards due especially to their scarce technologic innovation as a result of 12 The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy

13 Table1. Turnover and employment rates by subsector of defence (2009) Total employment Total defence sales* Aerospace 10,173 3, El subsector aeroespacial es el subsector de mayor facturación y empleo de todo el sector de defensa Naval 5,339 1, Electronics 9,167 1, Vehicles 2, Engineering 1, Arms and ammunition Total 29,731 6, *In million euros. Source: prepared by the authors Graphic 1. Sales by Defence subsectors (2009) Electronics 18% Vehicles 9% Engineering 3% Arms and ammunition 2% Aerospace 45% Naval 23% Source: prepared by the authors Graphic 2. Employment by Defence subsectors (2009) Electronics 31% Vehicles 10% Engineering 5% Arms and ammunition 3% Aerospace 33% Naval 18% Source: prepared by the authors the labour-intensive manufacture of warships and the strong competition from other manufacturing countries such as South Korea and Indonesia. In 2004 the company s losses amounted to E2.6bn. 10 The reason for the losses was an investigation by the European Commission into the aid granted to Izar by the Spanish Government, which annulled the aid received, leaving the company near collapse. So in 2005 the socialist government again divided the civil shipyards from the military shipyards and the new military company 10. See Table 9 in the Annex. was called Navantia, while most civil shipyards disappeared. Navantia has four lines of commercial activity. Table 2 shows the turnover for each one of these activities in 2009 and Naval manufacture is the most significant activity. In order to survive Navantia specialised in warships with greater added value such as aircraft carriers, submarines and frigates, investing heavily in R&D. It also built important strategic alliances to compete on the global market creating consortiums Las cuatro grandes empresas de la industria militar en España (Navantia, Indra, EADS-Casa y General Dynamics/Santa Bárbara) representaron en 2009 el 75,4% del de la facturación y el 74% del empleo en el sector industrial militar 13 The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy

14 Since it was founded Navantia has always recorded negative results. It has accumulated losses amounting to E3.3bn in the last ten years Table 2. Commercial Activity of Navantia Commercial Activity Naval manufacture Repairs Turbines and engines Systems and arms In thousands of Euros. Source: prepared by the authors. Table 3. Subsidies given to Navantia Year Amount , , ,827 In thousands of Euros. Source: prepared by the authors. On December 31 st 2010 Navantia owed E2.7bn to the Ministry of Industry In order to survive Navantia specialised in warships with greater added value such as aircraft carriers, submarines and frigates, investing heavily in R&D to unite technological, economic and industrial efforts. Let s see some examples. In January 1999 Izar and the American Lockheed Martin created the Advance Frigate Consortium (AF- CON) to incorporate the technological antiaircraft AEGIS system created by Lockheed Martin, undoubtedly the most advanced, to compete jointly in the international frigate market. Izar and the French DCNI founded the Scorpone consortium in 1991, to share the manufacture of submarines at 50%. It signed an agreement with the German shipyard HDW to develop the project of a mini-submarine. Besides this it has divisions for repairs and the manufacture of turbines and diesel engines for all kinds of warships. Finally, it develops arms systems for warships through the FABA programme, specialized in fighting systems, communications, shooting direction and weapons systems. Through the same programme it works with Lockheed Martin on the above mentioned AE- GIS System. Since it was founded Navantia has always recorded negative results. Its losses have always been assumed by SEPI. Table 9 in the Annex shows how it has accumulated losses amounting to E3.3bn in the last ten years despite the 300% rise of its turnover and despite having received significant subsidies every year from different institutions such as the local government of the autonomous region of Murcia or from the European Union and especially from the Ministry of Industry(Table 3). Navantia is also granted interest free loans by the Ministry of Industry for the development (R&D) of special military programmes for the Ministry of Defence. According to the company s balance, on the 31st of December 2010 it owed E2.7bn to the Ministry of Industry for these programs. These loans make Navantia the most protected company of the Spanish military-industrial complex. EADS-Casa Construcciones Aeronáuticas S.A. (CASA) specialises in the manufacture of medium and light military transport aircraft and in the early 1990s it became the world leader in this production sector. Despite its leadership it recorded important losses until For this reason in July 2000 the rightwing government decided to merge it with the European consortium European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), comprising the French company Aerospatiale-Matra owned by Lagardere, the German company Daimler Chrysler Aerospatiale (DASA) and Alenia (Italy). Since that moment CASA was named EADS-Casa. In return for this merge SEPI gained 5,5% shares in the consortium. The European consortium EADS is the second European military company after the English BAE Systems and the second world military aerospace company after Boeing. Its 121,691 employees are distributed among 70 centres in 48 countries. EADS has specialised manufacture divisions: Airbus Military for the fighter aircraft such as the EF-2000 (Eurofighter) and the cargo military aircraft A400M; Eurocopter produces helicopters such as the Tigre fighter and the military cargo NH- 90 helicopters; Astrium specialises in the production of space rockets and Galileo satellites; lastly, it has the second largest division for the production of missiles in the world (through 37.5% of MBDA) which manufactures, among others, the Meteor and the ASMP-A for the transport of nuclear warheads. 14 The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy

15 EADS has different subsidiaries in Spain. EADS-Casa is the aeronautic division whose production is 85%-95% military. In November 2009 EADS-Casa was named Airbus Military for the manufacture of military aeronautics. EADS-Casa owns 60% shares in CESA S.A. (Compañía Española de Sistemas Aeronáuticos). Eurocopter is another of its subsidiaries, based in Albacete and specialising in the manufacture of both civilian and military helicopters. Military helicopters (such as the Tigre, EC-135 or cargo NH-90 helicopters) make up 90% of its production. Other less relevant subsidiaries are EADS Astrium and EADS Casa Espacio, both specialising in space engineering and EADS Defence in defence engineering (called Cassidian Solutions since 2010). In 2008 and 2009 EADS-Casa was granted subsidies amounting to E391m for different items (capital, exploitation and interest) in order for it to be able to keep its activity, its workplaces and investments (Table 4). Moreover, as in the case of Navantia, there are other types of aid: the advances (credit) granted by the public administration, mostly by the Ministry of Industry for R&D. These are 0% interest loans payable over 20 years. According to the balance of EADS-Casa, on the 31st of December 2009 the company had received E191.6m from this type of aid. These loans and subsidies highlight how strongly the Spanish state supports EADS-Casa. The important increase that can be seen for 2009, both in sales and employment 11 is due to the fact that the data we used include all the companies of the Group EADS-Casa operating in Spain, such Airbus Military, EADS-Casa Espacio, EADS Defence and Eurocopter. We do not have this data at our disposal for the previous years. Failure and corruption in EADS The consortium EADS owns 100% of Airbus, the company charged with the manufacture of the aircraft A See Table 10 and 11 in the Annex. Table 4. Subsidies given to EADS-Casa for civil transport that was meant to compete with the American company Boeing in the field of world civil transport. On the 13th of June 2006 Airbus announced that the supply of its A-380 would be postponed due to technological problems and also announced that the cost would be doubled. This caused the company s shares to go down by 27% in the stock market and a big scandal because just three months earlier Airbus co-chairman, Noël Forgerard, had sold its stock-options shares gaining E3.8m. The main private shareholders of EADS, such as the French arms producer Arnaud Lagardere and his German partner Daimler-Chrysler had done the same, selling 7.5% shares. The first-hand information they had at disposal was decisive in their selling of half their shares for capital gains that reached E7m while the capital owned by the French and Spanish states and the rest of the shareholders lost its value. As a result of the scandal and pressure from the states, the managers of EADS were fired but thanks to their dismissal-proof contracts they got enormous compensations (E14m). The French Authority for Financial Markets charged 20 managers of EADS for the use of privileged information. Eventually the gamble taken by the states of the EADS consortium to put it at the cutting edge of technological and industrial innovation in Europe was jeopardised by the image of corruption given by its managers. Capital subsidies Year 2008 Year 2009 Ministry of Economy 72,069 44,777 Ministry of Science and Technology 22,431 18,170 Ministry of Industry and Energy 17,707 17,970 Ministry of Education and Science European Union Andalusia local government 85, ,485 Andalusia Technologic Corporation City council of Seville Autonomous Region TOTAL 200, ,878 In thousands of Euros. Source: prepared by the authors. CASA, specialises in the manufacture of medium and light military transport aircraft and in the early 1990s it became the world leader in this production sector Eurocopter is another of its subsidiaries, based in Albacete and specialising in the manufacture of both civilian and military helicopters 15 The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy

16 In 2008 and 2009 EADS- Casa was granted subsidies amounting to E391m. On the 31 st of December 2009 the company had also received E191.6m from the Ministry of Industry as R&D aid At the beginning of the program in 2001 the Spanish government committed itself to buy 27 aircraft for the initial cost of E3.4bn The governments participating in the project pf the A400M were forced to make extraordinary contributions amounting to E1.5bn. The Spanish government contributed E225m under the item technological development (R&D) One more failure, the A400M aircraft The military cargo A400M aircraft is another controversial case of EADS production. Seven countries were involved in the project (Germany, France, Belgium, United Kingdom, Spain, Turkey and Luxembourg) and committed themselves to buy 180 of the aircraft. Western Europe does not have large aircraft such as the A400M that can transport 400 soldiers and heavy material to very far destinations. At the beginning of the program in 2001 the Spanish government committed itself to buy 27 aircraft for the initial cost of E3.4bn. The project was delayed on a number of occasions because the countries participating in its production had not allocated sufficient resources for its development, which made the price of the project increase by E10bn on top of the predicted E20bn. EADS management then threatened to abandon the project if contributions were not made to finance the delay in the manufacture of the aircraft. The governments participating in the project were forced to make extraordinary contributions amounting to E1.5bn. The Spanish government contributed E225m (R.D. 26/6/2011) under the item technological development (R&D) to divide in the period between 2011 and 2013 by E75m per year. Finally it is worth mentioning that the refund of the credit is subjected to a tax on each sold aircraft from no. 185 to no. 464 between 2021 and This means that if the sales of the A400M aircraft do not exceed the 180 aircrafts already promised by the member states, EADS will not refund any of the loan it was granted, and it would do that only after selling 464 aircrafts. No country has yet committed itself to buy any A400M besides the seven countries already involved in its manufacture. General Dynamics Santa Bárbara Empresa Nacional Santa Bárbara S.A. was founded to produce all the light and heavy weaponry of the Spanish armed aorces such as artillery, missiles, rifles, ammunition and armoured vehicles. It was ly state-owned through the public company SEPI until 2000, when the right-wing government decided to privatise it due to its high losses. Three companies wanted to purchase it: the American General Dynamics, the German group Krauss Maffei, Rheinmetall and Explosivos Alaveses. In the end, in July 2001 Santa Bárbara was sold to General Dynamics, one of the world s biggest arms producers. SEPI stated that General Dynamics had promised to keep Santa Bárbara s entire workforce for five years, which the German company would not have done. This decision caused the reaction of the German government, which considered it to be counterproductive to European interests. The main objection was that Santa Bárbara was the concessionary for the manufacture of the Leopard armoured vehicles whose licence was given by the German company Kraus Maffei. This might have caused a transfer of technology and information about the Leopard vehicles in favour of its American rival General Dynamics that produces the Abrams tanks and is a rival for Germany in the world market. The second objection was that since 1999 the EU Partners had bet on a Community arms policy and had created the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the main European countries in the field of arms production joined it. It was never anything but contradictory to bet on a European military industry with the EU spurring many joint programmes (such as the EF-2000, the A400M military cargo aircraft or the Tigre helicopters) being able to compete with the US and then to leave Santa Bárbara in the hands of a US company allowing the penetration of the US arms industry into Europe. The sale to General Dynamics was made at the ridiculous price of E5m at a time when it was guaranteed a very juicy order for the production of 242 Leopard tanks for the value of E1.941bn (today it is E2.123bn), the modernisation of the Pizarro armoured vehicles for the value of E480.81m (now E781m), the 155/52mm towed howitzer for the value of E102.17m (today it is E191m) and a plan of am- 16 The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy

17 munition for the value of E180.3m. So as a matter of fact, General Dynamics was benefited by so many orders that Santa Bárbara became a very lucrative investment. Thanks to the above mentioned contracts the new company s management was able to invert the negative-results tendency and to make a profit since Yet Santa Barbara s future is still uncertain: General Dynamics opened other factories in Europe (in Switzerland, Germany and Austria) and Santa Barbara s managers are willing for the company s gains to grow through the manufacture of the new VBR 8x8 armoured vehicle that the Ministry of Defence announced it wants to purchase for E1.3bn and they hope that Saudi Arabia may want to purchase of its Leopard armoured vehicles for E3bn. Like the rest of the big companies of the military industrial oligopoly, Santa Bárbara receives 0% interests loans. According to its balance at the end of 2010 it owed E2.412bn to the Ministry of Industry for the advanced payments for R&D of the programs for the Leopard and Pizarro armoured vehicles, the transportable 155mm howitzer and the Spike missile. INDRA INISEL was founded in 1985 by the INI to consolidate the electronic and information technology sector of the public industry. It always recorded a loss, so in 1992 the government decided to merge it without any compensation with the private company CESELSA. Thus INDRA was created % of its shares were held by SEPI and the rest by the private sector. In 1999, when it made a profit, the state sold its shares to a number of shareholders 13 for bn pesetas while the Ministry of Defence charged it with the electronic development of most of its weapons, armoured vehicles, aircrafts, warships and other programs in the field of electronic warfare. In 2006 and 2007 Indra bought two companies in the same field, Azertia and Soluciona. This way, the company s workforce grew from 6,360 in 2000 to 26,175 in Today Indra has some 31,000 employees and is present in 30 countries. 14 During the last ten years Indra has managed to grow continuously with a 344% growth in sales. As concerns its production Indra is organized in three main areas of activity: information technology, simulation and automatic maintenance systems and electronic equipment for defence. According to its balances the defence sector represents 28-32% of its production but the sales it records are not divided between the civil and military field, so it is not possible to exactly determine the volume of its military production. Besides, part of its turnover in the security sector could be related to defence and yet not be included in these figures. Indra controls 80% of the Sociedad Española de Misiles (Inmize) that designs and develops missiles such as the Meteor, which is the arm system of the EF-2000 aircrafts, Rafale and Gripen. Inmize is the Spanish subsidiary of the main European missiles producer, MBDA, partly owned by the European group EADS and whose director was Pedro Morenés, the current Minister of Defence, until December Table 5 shows the itemisation of the direct subsidies received by Indra such as aids for export, training and especially for R&D by a number of public institutions. Just like the other big companies of the Spanish military oligopoly Indra is also granted 0% interest loans to return in 20 years, besides the subsidies, by the public administration for R&D (Table 6). Such aids show the favouritism that the public administration offers to a company that does not seem to need them, as it makes a significant profit each year. In July 2001 Santa Bárbara was sold to General Dynamics, one of the world s biggest arms producers According to its balance at the end of 2010 it owed E2.412bn to the Ministry of Industry for the advanced payments for R&D 12. See Table 9 of the Annex. 13. See the Map of the military industry network with the State and financial groups in Spain in the Annex. 14. See Table 11 in the Annex. 17 The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy

18 Table 5. Subsidies given to INDRA Capital Subsidies Year 2009 Year 2010 Ministry of Industry 2, Centro para el Desarrollo Tecnológico Industrial European Union Local government of the autonomous region Castilla y León Corporación Tecnológica Andaluza Local government of the autonomous region of Galicia Autonomous region of Aids to exports Aids to training 1,580 1,715 Other TOTAL 5,767 4,508 In thousands of Euros. Source: prepared by the authors. Table 6. Credits given to INDRA Credits for R&D Year 2009 Year 2010 Ministry of Industry 28,108 31,037 Centro Desarrollo Tecnológico Industrial 15,093 25,346 ENISA 3,250 3,250 TOTAL 46,451 59,633 In thousands of Euros. Source: prepared by the authors. During the last ten years Indra has managed to grow continuously with a 344% growth in sales Until 2010 Indra was also granted E64.14m by the public administration between subsidies and credit for R&D 7. THE SPANISH MILITARY INDUSTRY IN THE WORLD RANKING According to the SIPRI yearbook 15, Spanish companies rank among the 100 companies with the highest military production in the world (Table 7). So, in 2009 Navantia ranked 43th in the list and Indra ranked 65th. Other companies in the ranking are transnational military companies whose subsidiaries are also located in Spain. Among these we find the American General Dynamics (5) with Santa Bárbara Sistemas in Spain and Raytehon (6) with Raytehon Microelectronics; at 7 th place we find the European consortium EADS that controls Airbus Military among others; the French company Thales (11) whose Spanish subsidiary is Thales Alenia 15. SIPRI (2011): SIPRI Yearbook Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Nueva York, Oxford University Press. Space España; Eurocopter España is represented by Eurocopter (23) and Iveco España that belongs to the Italian FIAT (93). Finally we find other Spanish companies whose shares are partly held by a European military company that is included in the ranking. It is the case of the British Rolls Royce, at 19th place, that holds 49% of ITP (Industria de Turbo Propulsores) or of MBDA at 20th place, whose Spanish subsidiary is Inmize. This world strategy of business concentration is part of the phase that capitalism is currently going through and that we mentioned at the beginning, Globalisation. Military industries are significantly involved in this phase as we can see from the ranking. The highranking companies have their subsidiaries located in a vast number of world countries. As we explained Spain is also part of this process and, for example, Maxam has its subsidiaries in Ghana, Tanzania, Mali, Kazakhstan, Colombia, 18 The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy

19 Table 7. The Spanish military industry in the world ranking (2009) SIPRI* Ranking Company Sales in the defence sector* (Headquarters) Sales in the defence sector* (Spanish subsidiaries) 5 General Dynamics (Santa Bárbara) 25, Raytheon (Raytheon Microelectronics España) 23, EADS (Airbus Military) 15,930 2, Thales (Thales Alenia Space España) 10, Rolls Royce (ITP) 4, MBDA (Inmize) 3, Eurocopter (Eurocopter España) and EADS-Casa subsidiaries of EADS 3, Navantia - 1, INDRA Fiat (Iveco España) * In millions of current Euros. Source: prepared by the authors. Cameron, and up to 20 countries; Amper in Mexico and Brazil; Indra has its subsidiaries in 30 countries (among them Kenya, Morocco, Zimbabwe, China and Colombia); Sener in Mexico, Poland, Japan; Aernnova in the US. All these examples allow us an idea of the dimensions of the Spanish military industry that has also opted for globalisation. 8. WHO IS WHO IN THE SPANISH MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX What we name the military industrial complex is the network of interests existing around the military economic cycle. This means both the corporate interests of the armed forces professionals especially high-level officials-, shareholders, managers, commission agents and consultants of this industrial sector, and those of some politicians who end up in the network of the military industrial complex. All these interests, in one way or another, justify the existence of armed forces that are oversized with respect to real needs as well as the expenditure they represent (the end result of which is militarism, understood as the influence of the military on politics). It is more and more common for military companies to hire politicians who worked in the Ministry of Defence or high-level officials of the armed forces as managers. This is a common strategy of many countries given the benefits that companies gain by having managers with knowledge, personal relations and first-hand information about the military policies of their governments. Spain is not different in this: during the last ten years members of the military and politicians have left active service to be hired in droves as managers of military companies. Such was the case of Pedro Morenés, the new Ministry of Defence of the right-wing government that has been in power since December 2011 and the former chairman of MBDA España. MBDA is owned by three important European military industrial companies (EADS and BAE Systems hold 37.5% shares each and Finmeccanica holds 25%) and manufactures missiles (in Spain it produces the Meteor missile with a cost of E100m). Previously Morenés was also a consultant and representative of Instalaza, a military industry located in Zaragoza and entirely devoted to the manufacture of explosives. In the past it produced Spanish companies rank among the 100 companies with the highest military production in the world It is more and more common for military companies to hire politicians who worked in the Ministry of Defence or high-level officials of the armed forces as managers 19 The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy

20 Pedro Morenés, the new Ministry of Defence was the former chairman of MBDA España. Previously Morenés was also a consultant and representative of Instalaza Pedro Argüelles, who had been the director of the Spanish subsidiary of the US corporation Boeing, was chosen as the State Secretary of Defence General Carlos Villar Turrau was hired by General Dynamics/Santa Bárbara as vice-chairman of the business strategy division in February 2009 anti-personnel mines and cluster bombs, both currently prohibited in Spain. Through his mediation in 2007 the company sold cluster bombs to Gaddafi, right before they were prohibited in Spain. He was also the director of Segur Ibérica, the private security company that protects fishing vessels in the off the Somali coasts in the Indian sea. Between 1996 and 2000, with the right-wing government, Morenés was the State Secretary of Defence, between 2000 and 2002 he was the State Secretary for Security and he was State Secretary for Science and Technology until Furthermore, Morenés chose Pedro Argüelles, who had been the director of the Spanish subsidiary of the US corporation Boeing, that provided the Armed Forces with EF-18 Homet, Boeing 747, AV8V Harrier and Chinnok helicopters, as the State Secretary of Defence. The Morenés- Argüelles combination opens the door of the Ministry of Defence to two of the most important aeronautic companies of the world military industry. On the subject of ministers, a similar case was that of the former Minister of Defence during the socialist government of the Prime Minister Felipe González ( ), Julián García Vargas who, during his mandate, increased Spanish presence in NATO, adapted the armed forces to it and intensified international missions. He was later appointed as the chairman of TEDAE, the association which includes most Spanish military companies and was created to replace Afarmade. He is also a member of INDRA s advisory board. It is not accidental that the EADS subsidiary, Eurocopter, built a factory in Albacete when José Bono was the Minister of Defence and previously had been the president of the autonomous community of Castile-La Mancha. This is another good example political interests meeting those of the militaryindustrial sector. Some cases also stand out among military personnel. For example, General Carlos Villar Turrau, Commander in Chief of the Army until 2008, was hired by General Dynamics/Santa Bárbara as vice-chairman of the business strategy division in February It was also the case of the Commander in Chief of the navy, Admiral Sebastián Zaragoza, who was hired by the public-owned company Navantia as a commercial consultant for exports in November As we mentioned earlier, Admiral Francisco Torrente of the Spanish navy was appointed chairman of Explosivos Alaveses (Expal) in 2006 and before that Secretary General for Defence Policy (Segenpol). As a representative of Expal, Torrente was appointed as chairman of Afarmade in March 2009 until it was dissolved in September This hiring policy caused some protests within the armed forces about the appointment of military officials as managers of private arms companies as it harms the ethical behaviour of soldiers that should set an example and be objective, honourable and trustworthy. These principles are jeopardised by the entrance of military officials into private companies that are contractors of the Ministry of Defence. There were even quite disagreeable comments made by some military personnel about the favouritism of the Ministry towards some contracts granted to the company Santa Bárbara since it hired Carlos Villar. Another case was that of Aeronáutica del Espacio (BAiE), a Catalan business association made up of industry officials who work in the aerospace sector. Its aim is to obtain aid for its expansion in Catalonia. The chairman of BAiE was Fernando de Caralt, who had held highlevel positions in different military industries; for example he was chairman of CASA that is today part of Airbus Military- and was also the founder and chairman of Afarmade, the association of Spanish arms manufacturers. He is also the chairman of CIMSA, a company whose production is 50%-70% military and that provides parachutes for the EF-2000 aircraft and for the armed forces of the Spanish state and of other countries. Enrique Navarro held a number of high-level positions in the Ministry of Defence during the right-wing and left-wing governments. In 2011 he left the Ministry to found IC2, a logistics company that works in areas affect- 20 The military industrial complex. A parasite on Spanish economy