CHERNE intensive course: Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for PWR nuclear power plant

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1 CHERNE intensive course: Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for PWR nuclear power plant Martorell S. 1, Keshav C. 2 1 Universitat Politècnica de València (SPAIN) 2 Haute Ecole Spaak, rue Royale 150, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium

2 Background Objective? Give an introduction of the fundamentals and procedures of a probabilistic risk assessment and develop a practical case for a PWR nuclear power plant. Advantages? PRA is a systematic and comprehensive methodology to evaluate risks associated with every life-cycle aspect of a complex engineered technological entity, from concept definition, through design, construction and operation, and up to removal from service PRA has become a standard tool that helps risk informed decision making

3 Content & Logistic 1. Development of the course - Introduction to fundamentals and procedures - Lessons - Practical application Computers room 2. Introduction to fundamentals and procedures to develop a PRA - Introduction to LWR technology (Elements, PWR, BWR) - Overview of the PRA - Accident identification - Accident sequence modeling - Data assessment - Accident sequence quantification

4 Content & Logistic 1. Practical application to a PWR Nuclear Power Plant -Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LBLOCA) Level 1 PRA -Use of Software tools 2. Application tools -Level 1 PRA - LBLOCA documentation -FaultTree+, IAEA Database, 3. Evaluation of the course -Case Study (portfolio) 4. Reference Procedures for conducting PSA of NPP (Level 1). Safety Series Nº 50- P-4. International Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna

5 Overview 24h IC given in January 2011 at UPV for the first time and attended by students from Brussels and Jülich.

6 Introduction to fundamentals and procedures to develop a PRA

7 PRA: Risk Concept HAZARD ACCIDENT SEQUENCES INTERMEDIATE EVENTS RISK HAZARD INITIATING EVENT CONSE- QUENCE DAMAGE (SEVERITY) RISK FREQUENCY DECISION MAKING Reliability, Maintainability, Availability (RAM) of Safety Related Equipment (SRE) CAUSES (FAILURES, ERRORS, ) PROTECTION PREVENTION SAFETY PRINCIPLES AND SYSTEMS SAFETY

8 PRA: 3 levels! In international practice three levels of PRA evolved Level 1: Level 2: The assessment of plant failures leading to the determination of core damage frequency The assessment of containment response leading, together with Level 1 results, to the determination of containment release frequencies Level 3: The assessment of off-site consequences leading, together with the results of Level 2 analysis, to estimate public risks

PRA: Steps & tasks 1 2 3 4 5 6 Management and organization Identification of

sequence quantification Report of the analysis Procedures for conducting PRA of

9 PRA: Steps & tasks Management and organization Identification of hazards & accident initiators Accident sequence modeling Data assessment Accident sequence quantification Report of the analysis Procedures for conducting PRA of NPP (Level 1). Safety Series Nº 50- P-4. International Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna

10 Practical application to a PWR Nuclear Power Plant: LBLOCA

11 Introduction 1. PWR Nuclear Power Plant LBLOCA PRA level 1 2. Analysing Tools FaultTree+ IAEA Database 3. Steps Accident sequence modelling Data assessment Accident sequence quantification

12 Identification of hazards & Accident initiator 1. Familiarization with the plant 2. Identification of hazards (sources of radioactive release) 3. Selection of plant operational states 4. Definition of consequences and damage states 5. Identification of accident initiators 6. Determination of safety functions and plant systems

13 Identification of hazards & Accident initiator 1. Familiarization with the plant 2. Identification of hazards (sources of radioactive release) 3. Selection HAZARD: of plant operational states 4. Definition of consequences and damage states Core as the only source of radioactive release 5. Identification of accident initiators CONSEQUENCE: Core damage 6. Determination of safety functions and plant systems

14 Event Sequence Modeling using FaultTree+ (Reliability Workbench) FALLO DE LA INYECCION DE DOS O MAS ACUMULADORES GIATOP PRESION INSUFICIENTE EN ACUMULADORES POR ERRORES DE CALIBRACION GIA8 FALLOS INDEPENDIENTES DE ACUMULADORES GIAO >_ 2 FALLO DE LA INYECCION DEL ACUMULADOR 15T01A FALLO DE LA INYECCION DEL ACUMULADOR 15T01B FALLO DE LA INYECCION DEL ACUMULADOR 15T01C GIA1 GIA2 GIA3 DESCARGA INEFICAZ DEL ACUMULADOR 15T01A MODULO FALLOS BASICOS DE VALVULAS DE DESCARGA DEL ACUMULADOR 15T01A DESCARGA INEFICAZ DEL ACUMULADOR 15T01B MODULO FALLOS BASICOS DE VALVULAS DESCARGA DE ACUMULADOR 15T01B DESCARGA INEFICAZ DEL ACUMULADOR 15T01C MODULO FALLOS BASICOS DE VALVULAS DE DESCARGA DE ACUMULADOR 15T01C INOPERABILIDAD DEL ACUMULADOR GIA4 GMIA001 GIA5 GMIA002 GIA6 GMIA003 CASA-XR1 LOCA GRANDE O LOCA INTERMEDIO NO INDUCIDO POR ATWS LOCA EN RAMA FRIA DEL LAZO 1 DEL PRIMARIO LOCA GRANDE O LOCA INTERMEDIO NO INDUCIDO POR ATWS LOCA EN RAMA FRIA DEL LAZO 2 DEL PRIMARIO LOCA GRANDE O LOCA INTERMEDIO NO INDUCIDO POR ATWS LOCA EN RAMA FRIA DEL LAZO 3 DEL PRIMARIO GIA7 1TU10LRF1B GIA7 1TU10LRF2B GIA7 1TU10LRF3B

15 Data Assessment Assessment of the frequency of initiating events Assessment of RAM of components Databases Assessment of human error probabilities

16 Accident sequence quantification Qualitative analysis (Boolean equations) Quantitative analysis of frequencies of accident sequences Importance and sensitivity analysis Uncertainty analysis

18 Overview by students Very interesting (new or complementary, used for thesis, apply the software to any technical risk analysis : Japan!) Theory vs. Practical? Good distribution between both, theory well detailed and organized for short time, practical case help to understand some of the theoretical aspects Improvements? Maybe make the course longer Recommended? Yes by all the students! It was a good experience

19 Thank you for your attention

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